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Home ›A Modern Approach to the Study of Self-Control and Crime
For a contribution about self-control and crime, it is almost a must to start with Gottfredson and Hirschi. It was the publication of their book, A General Theory of Crime (GToC), in 1990 that established the notion of ‘self-control’ as a central issue in criminological theory for the decades to come. What made GToC’s argument so compelling at the time was the way it was able to reconcile the ‘classic‘ approach, stating that offenders decide to refrain from crime if the threat of punishment is high enough, with the persistent empirical evidence of inter-individual differences in criminal propensity or, in Gottfredson and Hirschi’s terms, ‘criminality’. In line with the classic approach, Gottfredson and Hirschi assume in GToC that people decide rationally whether to offend or not. Put simply, their premise in GToC is: if people expect more harm (e.g. punishment) than good, then they will refrain from offending. Differences in individual criminal propensity, they argue, must consequently be traceable to differences in the individual decision-making about criminal activity. Finding a clear definition of Gottfredson and Hirschi‘s key explanatory construct of ‘self-control’ in their seminal publication from 1990 is difficult and was a frequent subject of the countless critiques of their work. However, even before later clarifications and refinements of their construct and theory, it was already evident from their introduction to GToC that low self-control had something to do with a tendency to neglect long-term costs in favor of momentary advantages when making decisions about crime.
Modesty was not a feature of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s approach and they received much criticism for the boldness of their claims, their polemical style of argumentation, their tautological reasoning, and their confrontational approach.1 The empirical research that followed in the wake of GToC has often tried to falsify their boldest claims. Researchers have tested the generality of self-control theory on different samples, in different cultures, and on different outcomes. Very coarsely summarised (and leaving aside measurement issues), one can say that self-control matters indeed, but that Gottfredson and Hirschi overstated the reach of their theory. The applied measures of low self-control have proven to be consistent and reliable predictors of various types of deviant behavior. Moreover, self-control has been shown to predict crime in different types of samples and in different cultures. Apart from the generality of the theory, however, most of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s claims about the scope of the theory have not found empirical support. It is now safe to say that Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) overstated the importance of their theory, e.g. regarding the sufficiency of self-control theory in explaining crime and deviant behaviors, the stability of self-control, and about its roots in childrearing (only).
Much has been written about Gottfredson and Hirschi’s theory in the past 25 years, and it is easy to find empirical tests that rely on very different interpretations (e.g. whether it is intended to fully explain all crime or to find one cause common to all types of crime, whether Gottfredson and Hirschi assume absolute or relative stability of self-control, just to name two common examples). However, one development certainly not intended by the authors is the emergence of a reception which could be summarised as a “kinds-of-people“ interpretation of self-control theory, in which it loses most of its action-theoretic foundation in the criminological classics. Against the background of self-control’s non-redundant effect on criminal behavior and Gottfredson and Hirschi’s statements about its sufficiency in explaining criminal behavior, for many scholars ‘self-control’ developed into a synonym for ‘criminal propensity’. Self-control became a variable one had to ‘control for’ in order to take care of the problem of unobserved heterogeneity and to refute the reviewer’s argument “maybe it is not the effect, you are interested in [enter: delinquent friends, important life event, arrests…], but just self-control”.
Developments in psychology and neuroscience could give the study of self-control in the explanation of crime and deviance a fresh start. I would like to highlight some threads which seem to be promising starting points for a more modern approach to the study of self-control. To do this, I would like to cite my article2 for which I received the ESC Young Criminologist Award 2017 as one example. I hope that my paper is succeeded by more criminological research which takes such an approach, viewing self-control as a skill that helps one to make good decisions in life.
Good definitions are the foundation of every good theory. It would make no sense to theorise about mechanisms and the functioning of a concept, or its interaction with other concepts, before one is clear about the basic definition of the concept itself. Baumeister and et al. defined self-control as the “capacity for altering one’s own responses, especially to bring them into line with standards such as ideals, values, morals, and social expectations, and to support the pursuit of long-term goals.”3 Their strength model of self-control distinguishes between the basic capacity for self-control and the amount of self-control present at any moment. Similar to a muscle, which can get tired after repeated use, repeated application of self-control can lead to self-control depletion and thus a state of low self-control. Also, just like individuals differ in their amount of muscle mass, they differ in their capacity for self-control. What this model offers to criminology in addition to a clear definition of self-control is a dynamic view of self-control: the amount of self-control in a situation depends on individuals’ basic level of self-control capability, but also on influences like alcohol or drug use, previous self-control tasks and form of the day. Moreover, the analogy to a self-control muscle implies that self-control can be trained.4
Another model taken from advances in neuroscience also seems promising to the study of crime. The dual-system model by Steinberg et al. describes the development of two distinct neurobiological subsystems with underpinnings in different brain regions: the socio-emotional system and the cognitive control system.5 The socio-emotional system is seen as responsible for reward-seeking behavior, such as seeking out strong emotional experiences and thrills (sensation seeking). The cognitive control system is related to impulse control or the evaluation of the potential costs of decision-making. Steinberg et al. stress the difference between sensation-seeking and impulsivity, which are often conflated in empirical research:
Impulsivity refers to a lack of self-control or deficiencies in response inhibition; it leads to hasty, unplanned behavior. Sensation-seeking, in contrast, refers to the tendency to seek out novel, varied, and highly stimulating experiences, and the willingness to take risks in order to attain them. Not all impulsivity leads to stimulating or even rewarding experiences (e.g., impulsively deciding to end a friendship), and not all sensation-seeking is done impulsively (e.g., purchasing advance tickets to ride a roller coaster or sky dive).6
Adolescent risk-taking is supposed to be stimulated by a strong rise in dopaminergic activity within the socio-emotional system around the time of puberty, which brings about increases in reward-seeking behaviors. Risk-affinity increases until mid-adolescence (up to the age of 15 or 16) and then declines sharply.18 The increase in reward-seeking takes place before the structural maturation of the cognitive control system, which unfolds gradually over the course of adolescence and allows for more advanced self-regulation and impulse control. The temporal gap between the increase in reward-seeking, which is an early adolescent development, and the maturation of the cognitive control system creates a period of heightened vulnerability to risk-taking during middle adolescence. Applications of the dual-systems model to the study of crime and deviance so far seem to be promising19. Also, the dual-systems perspective might shed new light on the results of criminological self-control research using measures of risk-affinity or a combination of impulsivity and risk-affinity.
While Steinberg’s dual-systems model deals with a balance between sensation-seeking and internal controls, other dual-systems models differentiate between two general modes of decision-making. According to these models, individuals can choose to act either reflectedly and deliberately or in an automatic, habitual manner without paying attention to action alternatives. These models imply that it is only a subgroup of actors who weigh the costs and benefits of crime. The model by Strack and Deutsch7 tellingly calls the respective systems “reflective system” and “impulsive system.” Dual-process approaches to the study of crime8 have mainly considered an individual’s level of morality as a factor that influences whether an individual reflects on crime or whether he/she habitually conforms. However, psychological dual-system approaches such as the model by Strack and Deutsch would lead us to expect that higher levels of self-control also serve as a precondition for reflective calculating decision-making. Reflective calculation needs a high amount of cognitive capacity, while impulsive, automatic-spontaneous processing is possible with little mental effort and requires little cognitive capacity. Poor self-control capabilities or low situational levels of self-control, resulting e.g. from drowsiness, intoxication or self-control depletion, impede reflective calculation because of a lack of capacity, leading to acting in autopilot mode needing little or no attentional resources. Strack and Deutsch argue that reflective underregulation or the dominant operation of the impulsive system can be linked to deficits in executive capabilities due to structural damage to the prefrontal cortex.9 In a similar manner, Hofmann et al. 10 summarise experimental evidence that momentary self-regulatory resources, trait self-control, as well as cognitive capacity and alcohol consumption have an impact on reflectively calculating decision-making instead of unreflectively following hedonistic impulses and strong emotions. The connecting element might lie in the impairment of working memory functions: low self-regulatory resources, cognitive load, and alcohol consumption all dovetail insofar as they have been shown to disrupt working memory functions. Without support from working memory functions, reflective operations break down, whereas impulsive processes are left unaffected. Thomas and McGloin11 derived their hypotheses on differential susceptibility to deviant peer influences on the situational level and peer socialisation from such dual-system approaches as the model by Strack and Deutsch. Their results show that adolescents with high self-control are more susceptible to deviant peer socialisation than those with low self-control, potentially because only those with high self-control have the capacity to take into account what their peers think.
Once we are clear about our theoretical model, we must address the problem of measuring self-control. There are various behavioral tests available (e.g. Stroop task, Go/No-Go-Task)12, but most research in the field of criminology uses questionnaire measurements. Well-established scales from psychology are, for example, the 13-item self-control scale by Tangney et al. and the Barrat Impulsiveness Scale.13 Whatever technique one uses, the measure should/ capture self-control in the intended sense and nothing else. Necessary features of a good self-control measure are therefore construct validity and unidimensionality. More explicitly, an empirical test of any self-control hypothesis will inevitably lead to wrong conclusions, if the measure of its core construct is biased by dimensions having nothing to do with self-control. This should be a strong argument against composite measures of self-control, such as the scale by Grasmick et al.14 Also, this should be an argument against picking a subdimension (such as risk-affinity) for one’s empirical model and interpreting the result with references to a full measure (of self-control or criminal propensity). To be sure, the Grasmick scale certainly captures a good representation of different dimensions of criminal propensity (just to remember: self-centredness, preference for physical activities over cognitive tasks, preference for easy solutions), and it also features subdimensions of self- or impulse control as understood here (particularly the impulsivity dimension and items from the temper dimension). What is more, the risk-affinity subscale and the impulsivity subscale could probably be used to assess vulnerability according to the dual-systems model by Steinberg.15 Nevertheless, every researcher should take a minute (or two) to make sure that his/her measurement of self-control indeed ‘fits’ his/her theoretical model. If you want a representation of criminal propensity, fine — but please do not use a fruit salad to draw inferences on apples, bananas, or pineapples.
Looking at roughly the last decade, there has been a growing number of empirical studies pursuing a more modern approach to the study of self-control and crime, adapting a dynamic model of self-control and/or treating self-control as a capacity which helps individuals to act in the interest of their higher-order, long-term goals. Also, measuring self-control by combining several subdimension of criminal propensity has increasingly become subject to criticism.16 Two recent publications bundle the accumulated evidence on the functioning of self-control into a research agenda, laying excellent foundations for a more modern approach to the study of self-control and crime. Pratt organises an integrated self-control/life-course theory of criminal behavior around 10 empirically testable propositions17. Its key suggestions are 1) to see self-control skills as a dynamic capability which is based on executive functioning and accordingly subject to maturational reform as well as depletable through excessive use, and 2) to see self-control as an important cause of selection into negative life events, which are themselves causes of offending. Moreover, Pratt states that self-control serves as a coping resource to handle such negative life events and that it has an indirect effect on other coping resources. Similarly, Pratt argues, self-control can be assumed to influence the sensitivity to formal and informal sanctions.
In their 2016 book Self-control and Crime Over the Life Course, Hay and Meldrum likewise favour a life-course approach to the study of self-control and crime. Their book comprises the sum of two and a half decades of self-control research and vividly illustrates these insights with examples from the media. They define self-control as “a practice in which individuals deliberately act upon themselves to alter their immediate urges, impulses, inclinations, or temptations (...) in order to bring responses into line with higher-order standards that respond to a person’s values, morals, social commitments, and long-term well-being”20 and therefore put the interaction of self-control with other factors center stage. Hay and Meldrum’s definition of self-control allows deriving hypotheses about the interaction between self-control and numerous other factors, such as morality, risk of punishment, delinquent peers, or strain. Undoubtedly material for a lot of empirical studies.
Ideally, I would like to see my paper as one of the first in a line of criminological research, which takes a more modern, cross-disciplinary approach to the study of self-control, referring increasingly less often to the criminological classic by Gottfredson and Hirschi. Such an approach would instead make good use of insights provided by psychology and neuroscience, seeing self-control as a construct of agency and studying its interaction with other constructs important in the decision making process.
Sonja Schulz is PostDoc at the Data Archive for the Social Sciences, GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences
1 See for example Akers, Ronald L. 1991. “Self-Control as a General Theory of Crime”. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 7(2): 201–211, and Tittle, Charles R. 1991. “Book Review of ‘A General Theory of Crime’”. American Journal of Sociology, 96(6): 1609–1611.
2 Schulz, Sonja. 2016. “‘Don’t Blow Your Cool’: Provocation, Violent Coping, and the Conditioning Effects of Self-Control”. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 32(4): 561–587.
3 Baumeister, Roy F., Kathleen D. Vohs, and Dianne M. Tice. 2007. “The Strength Model of Self-Control”. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16(6): 351–355, p. 352.
4 With promising results on self-control training: Muraven, Mark. 2010. “Building Self-Control Strength: Practicing Self-Control Leads to Improved Self-Control Performance”. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2): 465–468.
5 Steinberg, Laurence, Dustin Albert, Elizabeth Cauffman, Marie Banich, Sandra Graham, and Jennifer Woolard. 2008. “Age differences in sensation seeking and impulsivity as indexed by behavior and self-report: Evidence for a dual systems model”. Developmental Psychology, 44(6): 1764–1778.
6 Steinberg, Laurence, Dustin Albert, Elizabeth Cauffman, Marie Banich, Sandra Graham, and Jennifer Woolard. 2008. “Age differences in sensation seeking and impulsivity as indexed by behavior and self-report: Evidence for a dual systems model”. Developmental Psychology, 44(6): 1764–1778, p. 1765, emphasis and references dropped.
7 Strack, Fritz, and Roland Deutsch. 2004. “Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior”. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(3): 220–247.
8 See e.g. Wikström, Per-Olof H., Dietrich Oberwittler, Kyle Treiber, and Beth Hardie. 2012. Breaking Rules: The Social and Situational Dynamics of Young People’s Urban Crime. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
9 Strack, Fritz, and Roland Deutsch. 2004. “Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior”. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(3): 220–247.
10 Hofmann, Wilhelm, Malte Friese, and Fritz Strack. 2009. “Impulse and Self-Control From a Dual-Systems Perspective”. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(2): 162–176.
11 Thomas, Kyle J., and Jean M. McGloin. 2013. “A Dual-Systems Approach for Understanding Differential Susceptibility to Processes of Peer Influence”. Criminology, 51(2): 435–474.
12 See Duckworth, Angela L., and Margaret L. Kern. 2011. “A Meta-Analysis of the Convergent Validity of Self-Control Measures”. Journal of Research in Personality, 45(3): 259–268.
13 See Tangney, June P., Roy F. Baumeister, and Angie L. Boone. 2004. “High Self-control Predicts Good Adjustment, Less Pathology, Better Grades, and Interpersonal Success”. Journal of Personality, 72(2): 271–324., and Patton, Jim H., Matthew S. Stanford, and Ernest S. Barratt. 1995. “Factor structure of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51(6), 768–774.
14 Grasmick, Harold G., Charles R. Tittle, Robert J. Bursik, and Bruce J. Arneklev. 1993. “Testing the Core Empirical Implications of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory of Crime”. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30(1): 5–29.
15 Steinberg, Laurence, Dustin Albert, Elizabeth Cauffman, Marie Banich, Sandra Graham, and Jennifer Woolard. 2008. “Age differences in sensation seeking and impulsivity as indexed by behavior and self-report: Evidence for a dual systems model”. Developmental Psychology, 44(6): 1764–1778.
16 For example Felson, Richard B., and D. Wayne Osgood. 2008. “Violent Crime”. In: Goode, Erich (ed) Out of Control. Assessing the General Theory of Crime. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008, pp. 160–72.
17 Pratt, Travis C. 2016. “A self-control/life-course theory of criminal behavior”. European Journal of Criminology, 13(1): 129–146.
18 Steinberg, Laurence. 2009. “Should the science of adolescent brain development inform public policy?”. American Psychologist, 64(8): 739–750.
19 See Vazsonyi, Alexander T., and Albert J. Ksinan. 2017. “Understanding deviance through the dual systems model: Converging evidence for criminology and developmental sciences”. Personality and Individual Differences, 111: 58–64, and Burt, Callie H., Gary Sweeten, and Ronald L. Simons. 2014. “Self-Control through Emerging Adulthood: Instability, Multidimensionality, and Criminological Significance”. Criminology, 52(3): 450–487.
20 Hay, Carter, and Ryan C. Meldrum. 2016. Self-Control and Crime Over the Life Course. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, p. 5.