Challenges of European Integration: Challenges for Criminology

By Krzysztof Krajewski

The fifth annual conference of the European Society of Criminology will take place in Krakow, Poland from August 31 to September 3, 2005, hosted by Jagiellonian University and the Polish Criminological Association. The conference will be held in three buildings belonging to the university, right in the heart of the historic Old Town: Collegium Novum (the main administrative building), Wroblewski Collegium, and Larisch Palace. All are part of the Faculty of Law.

These buildings offer convenient conference facilities. The modern auditorium in Larisch Palace will accommodate the plenaries, the general assembly will be held in the university’s historic aula in Collegium Novum, and there are smaller rooms for panel sessions. In these settings, conference participants will appreciate both the illustrious history of Jagiellonian University and its contemporary role for Krakow and for Poland. Krakow’s old town will prove a magnificent setting.

Poland, along with ten other countries, became a member of the European Union on May 1, 2004. This latest EU enlargement constituted a major step towards building a united Europe and overcoming political, social, and economic divisions resulting from World War II. However, this

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Why are Europe’s Crime Rates Falling?

By Michael Tonry

Conspicuous by its absence in western criminology is a literature on why crime rates have fallen continuously in some countries and intermittently in others since the early-to-mid 1990s. That’s strange since by definition criminologists should be interested in crime and the downturn, after two decades’ increases, is a striking and heartening development.

The only specialized literature on the subject (e.g., Blumstein and Wallman 2000) attempts to assess whether and to what extent harsh American crime control policies of the past quarter century—particularly quadrupling of the imprisonment rate since 1973 to 725 per 100,000 population—caused the American crime rate decline.

The standard answer, often given after exceedingly complicated quantitative modeling, is that increased American use of imprisonment probably had some effect on the crime rate decline but at most a minor one. The

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CESDIP and Criminal Sociology in France

By Laurent Mucchielli

The Centre de Recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit et les Institutions Pénales (CESDIP) is both a research centre of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and a Ministry of Justice research department. Created in 1983, it succeeded the Service d’Études Pénales et Criminologiques (SEPC), the history of which I describe below. I then reflect on CESDIP’s role in French research in criminology in the nineties and describe the centre’s researchers and current activity.

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Language as Communication: Language as a Barrier

I live in Belgium, a small country with three official languages: Dutch (Flemish), French, and German. The majority (60%) speak Dutch, 40% French, and fewer than 1% German. When Belgium became independent in 1830, the constitution recognised freedom of language, but French was the only official language: in politics and trade, in the legal system, in the army, and in universities. French was then the international ‘lingua franca’, but in the newly created Belgium it was also the language of the rich and powerful, and of those who tried to belong to or imitate that group. It took a hundred years before Belgium had its first Dutch-speaking university: Ghent, in 1930, a reform that is generally seen as an important instrument for the democratisation of higher education in Belgium. When the Dutch-speaking sections of the Universities of Leuven and Brussels sought independence in 1968, one of the arguments against was that ‘Dutch was not a scientific language.’ The student association at my Brussels University is still called ‘No Language, No Freedom.’

Belgium is now a federal state, with three parliaments and three officially recognised cultural communities. Others study it as an example of how to cope with diversity without resorting to civil war. English has taken over as the new ‘lingua franca’ and has proven an excellent instrument for international communication and exchange in politics, trade, and science. I now teach one postgraduate course at the University of Ghent in English.

However, when I sit on scientific boards or look at the Web of Science, I am struck by the dismissive attitude towards non-English publications and networks. Criminology is a social science topic that is both local and international, and must try to cover both dimensions. Crime and punishment exist everywhere, but cannot be fully understood if we do not take into account both their cultural embeddedness and transnational developments. My research, for example, focuses on sentencing and prisons. If I study structural and cultural elements in the Belgian judiciary that hamper the application of non-custodial sanctions, or why different Belgian prisons experience different levels of violence, I hope the results will be read by Belgian judges, prison directors and prison guards.

That means I have to write in Dutch and in French. Of course, these results may also be interesting for international comparison, which means I also have to write in English. However, international comparison has taught me that the penal culture of Belgian judges is not the same as that of English or Swedish judges, and although prisons everywhere share some characteristics, Belgian prisons are quite different from Dutch, French, or American ones.

The ambition to discover this diversity and to learn from comparisons is, in my view, an essential characteristic of the European Society of Criminology. It is illustrated by section 6 of the constitution which states that the annual meeting should rotate among the various countries and regions of Europe and that English shall be the working language of ESC meetings.

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The European Union's expansion eastwards increased the number of member states and substantially heightened ambitions to create a common legal space. This necessitates co-operation.

The uniqueness of each national system seems to present significant obstacles to successful co-operation. These obstacles may appear to be bigger, however, than they really are.

There are significant differences from country to country in norms concerning police functions, suggesting that the police role in criminal proceedings varies significantly. In all systems the police are organisationally independent and have entirely separate functions and chains of command from the prosecution service. This article focuses on interdependence between police and prosecutors in the investigation of crimes and in decisions on whether to take cases to court.

Readers not familiar with European prosecution systems need to know of the distinction between the ‘legality’ and ‘opportunity’ principles. In ‘legality principle’ systems such as Germany’s, police and prosecutors have, in principle, no discretion whether to proceed with apparently provable cases brought before them; only judges may do that. In ‘opportunity principle’ systems like the Netherlands, the prosecution in principle has discretion to exclude cases that are inadequate or “will not stand up” to the tests a court will apply before entering a conviction.

The changing role of European prosecution is a child of the French revolution although it has roots reaching further back in many jurisdictions (in particular the French ministère public and the Scottish procurator-fiscal). The central function of a prosecution service is to prepare a case against a suspected offender, to be brought before a court.

This includes the need to exclude cases that are inadequate or “will not stand up” to the tests a court will apply before entering a conviction.

A public prosecution service may guide investigations and decide objectively whether there is sufficient evidence to justify taking a case against a suspected offender, to be brought before a court.

The extent to which a prosecutor interacts with the court and is regarded as responsible for the investigatory stage varies widely across Europe. But the basic prosecution role is that of a legal filter, a translation service between police and court services. The central, key function was and is the same.

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Applications or nominations for these five candidates had been received by the time this issue went to press. Additional candidates may be put forward through July 2005

Gorazd Meško

Gorazd Meško is associate professor of criminology at the Faculty of Criminal Justice, University of Maribor, Slovenia. He received a PhD from the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His special interests are crime prevention, fear of crime, security issues, and comparative criminological research. Among his major writings in English are Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe (ed., 2000) and Dilemmas of Contemporary Criminal Justice (2004). Major publications in Slovene include Family Ties before the Court (1997), Introduction to Criminology (1998), Basics of Crime Prevention (2002), Visions of Slovenian Criminology (2002), and Crime Prevention – theory, practice and dilemmas (2004).

Per-Olof Wikström


Professor Wikström was elected Northern Scholar by the University of Edinburgh in 1991, the 1994 recipient of the American Society of Criminology’s Thorsten Sellin and Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck Award, for outstanding contributions to criminology, and in 2002 a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University (U.S.). Professor Wikström was a founder member of the European Society of Criminology.

Uberto Gatti

Uberto Gatti (MD) is professor of Criminology and Director of the Postgraduate Courses in Clinical Criminology at the University of Genoa (Italy), and Associate investigator at the Research Unit on Children’s Psycho-Social Maladjustment (GRIP) at the University of Montreal.

He has been visiting professor at the Universities of Montreal, Ottawa and Lausanne, and a member of the Conseil de Direction du Centre International de Criminologie Comparée of the University of Montreal, a member of the Criminological Scientific Council of the Council of Europe, and Chairman for the 20th Criminological Research Conference (Strasbourg, 1993). He was a member of the Enlarged Group of Specialists on trends in crime and criminal justice for the first edition of the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice, and the Italian correspondent for the second edition. He worked on the International Self-Report Delinquency study (ISRD 1) and is co-ordinating the Italian contribution to the ISRD 2. He was a founder member of the European Society of Criminology and is currently a member of the Eurogang network and President of the Italian Society of Criminology.

Alan Block

Alan Bock earned his PhD in History at UCLA in 1975. After spending 11 years at the University of Delaware, he moved on to Penn State University where he has been for the last 20 years. He has plenty of experience in dealing with significant changes that have taken place in both those universities. His contacts with Europe are many. He has taught a summer course for American students through Leiden University for the past 30 years and has also helped with courses for Americans in Sicily, Rome, and Copenhagen.

Analida Ivankovic

Analida Ivankovic is an Auxiliary Police Officer for the New York City Police Department and an associate managing editor for Police Practice and Research: An International Journal. As a graduate student at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City she majored in public administration and police science/criminal justice. She has also served as treasurer of the Auxiliary Police Benevolent Association in New York City. Her special interests are police line-ups and accuracy in eyewitness research; criminal justice policy; and reformation of the justice systems of Eastern Europe. She has given many presentations, including ‘What works in fighting crime’, a USA survey, at the annual meeting of the ESC in Amsterdam.
**KRAKOW 2005, CALENDAR OF EVENTS**

**Wednesday, 31 August**
- 15.00 – 18.00 Registration (Collegium Novum)
- 18.00 – 20.00 Welcome reception, Minister of Justice of Poland (Collegium Novum)

**Thursday, 1 September**
- 09.00 – 10.30 Welcome and plenary:
  - *Contemporary criminological theory and penal reality*
  - Christian Pfeiffer, Sonja Snacken, and Michael Tonry
- 10.30 – 11.00 Coffee break
- 11.00 – 12.15 Panel sessions (15 parallel sessions)
- 12.15 – 13.30 Lunch break
- 13.30 – 14.45 Panel sessions
- 15.00 – 16.15 Panel sessions
- 16.15 – 16.45 Coffee break
- 16.45 – 18.00 Panel sessions
- 20.00 Reception in the courtyard of Collegium Maius

**Friday, 2 September**
- 09.00 – 10.15 Plenary:
  - *Issues of social cohesion and social exclusion in contemporary criminology*
  - Michel Kokoreff, Miklos Levay, and Dietrich Oberwittler
- 10.15 – 10.45 Coffee break
- 10.45 – 12.15 General Assembly
- 12.15 – 13.30 Lunch break
- 13.30 – 14.45 Panel sessions
- 15.00 – 16.15 Panel sessions
- 16.15 – 16.45 Coffee break
- 16.45 – 18.00 Panel sessions
- 19.00 Reception, Mayor of Krakow, Town Hall

**Saturday, 3 September**
- 09.00 – 10.15 Panel sessions
- 10.15 – 10.45 Coffee break
- 10.45 – 12.00 Panel sessions
- 12.15 – 13.00 Plenary:
  - *Criminal justice reform in Central and Eastern Europe*
  - Andrzej Siemaszko, Louise Shelley, and Helena Valkova
- 13.00 – 13.30 Closing ceremony
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iii. The Editor-in-Chief of the European Journal of Criminology
iv. The Organizer of the next Annual Meeting
v. The Organizer of the last Annual Meeting.

Elected members are voting members of the Executive Board and shall be actively involved in research and/or teaching in Europe. Appointed members are non-voting members of the Executive Board. Nevertheless, the Newsletter Editor can vote on issues related to the Newsletter; the Editor-in-Chief of the European Journal of Criminology can vote on issues related to the European Journal of Criminology; and the Organizers of the Annual Meetings can vote on issues related to the Annual Meetings. Members of the Executive Board shall not occupy at the same time more than one of functions (a) to (d) and (i) to (v) listed above.

The Executive Board can invite, occasionally or permanently, further non-voting members to participate in its meetings.

The president is elected for a term of three business years: the first year as President-Elect, the second year as President, and the third year as Past-President. The President, the President-Elect, and the Past-President shall not come from the same country. A former President of the ESC is not eligible for re-election as President but is eligible for any other elected or appointed position on the Executive Board.

The two-at large Board members are elected for a term of two business years. There must be an interval of two years between any two terms served by them on the Executive Board.

The Executive Secretary, the Newsletter Editor, and the Editor-in-Chief of the European Journal of Criminology are appointed by the Executive Board for a term of five business years, reconfirmable annually by the Executive Board.

The Executive Board shall meet at least once in each business year. It decides by vote of the majority of those members entitled to vote who are present at the meeting, or alternatively by postal ballot. No member shall take part in the discussion or vote where a conflict of interest may arise between his or her personal interests and those of the ESC.

The Executive Board takes office on the day following the General Assembly that takes place during the Annual Meeting. The business year ends on the day of the General Assembly that takes place during the following Annual Meeting. The financial report covers a full fiscal year.

Challenges of European Integration  
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process is by no means problem-free. Transnational crime and its control is one of the most serious issues facing contemporary Europe.

The Krakow conference constitutes an attempt to answer the question: to what extent does criminological research and teaching in an integrating Europe provide a basis for integrated European approaches to crime and its control?

The theme of the 2004 conference in Amsterdam was ‘Global similarities, local differences.’ The Krakow conference builds on this theme. How is it possible in a Europe with so many national and local differences better to integrate criminological research and teaching, and improve the exchange of research results and practical experience between academics and practitioners of crime prevention, law enforcement, and the administration of criminal justice?

The goal should be a truly European criminology providing answers to many problems and challenges on a European level.

By May 30, 32 peer-reviewed panels had been proposed for the Krakow conference, and 235 abstracts of individual presentations had been received. These arrived from almost all European countries and from the USA, Canada, Australia and elsewhere. Organizers expect about 500 participants.

The conference will officially open on Wednesday, August 31, at 6.00 p.m. with a reception in Collegium Novum hosted by the Polish Minister of Justice.

The social programme will include a reception in the 14th Century Collegium Maius, the oldest university building, on Thursday, September 1, and a reception hosted by the Mayor of Krakow in the City Hall on Friday, September 2. Excursions to visit the city’s important historical monuments will also be available.

The organizers hope the Krakow conference will form the next major step in the development of the European Society of Criminology.

The ESC is soliciting applications to host annual meetings from 2007 onwards. Applications should identify the proposed organising committee and leader, describe the physical facilities that will be available (and how many attendees can be accommodated), set out a proposed budget, describe local funding sources likely to be available to underwrite conference costs, and explain why, in light of the recent distribution of annual meeting sites, the site proposed is an appropriate one.

Applications should be sent to Professor Marcelo Aebi, Executive Secretary, Andalusian Institute of Criminology, University of Sevilla, E.T.S.I.I. - Avda Reina Mercedes s/n, 41012 Sevilla, SPAIN, Email: aebi@us.es.
standard estimates vary between 15 and 25 percent, but they are likely to exaggerate the effect. Most western countries have experienced substantial declines in crime rates since the early 1990s without enormous increases in imprisonment rates and without adoption of strikingly harsher crime control policies. It is hard to imagine that only in the U.S. would crime rates otherwise have risen (had the U.S. not adopted such harsh policies).

The most plausible claim that can be made about the effects of American crime control policies on crime is that they may have caused crime rates to decline somewhat more sharply, or slightly sooner, than elsewhere, but that they would have declined substantially anyway.

The question remains, therefore, Why have crime rates in western countries declined? This short article doesn’t answer that question, but in its final section sets out hypotheses about things that might be parts of the explanation. The first two sections provide a quick overview of interactions between crime rates and punishment patterns in western countries, and summarize the evidence that demonstrates that declining crime rates are a general phenomenon that pays little attention to national boundaries.

1. Crime and Punishment Interactions

Punishment and crime have little to do with each other. That observation is a commonplace for most European criminologists, some North American criminologists, and very few politicians or ordinary citizens anywhere. Its accuracy, however, is becoming ever more evident as tools accumulate for looking across national boundaries at relations between punishment and crime.

The idea that changes in punishment practices should affect crime rates is not unreasonable. In every-day life, we respond to changed incentives and costs all the time, including prospective changes in penalties. Changes in how vigorously no-parking rules are enforced, or how visibly police cars patrol highways, for example, quickly and palpably affect parking and driving behavior.

The idea that crime should affect punishment also is not unreasonable. Even discounting for manpower shortages, reduced efficiency, and caseload pressures that substantial rises in crime rates produce, it is reasonable to suppose that more crime will produce more arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences, and that prison populations and imprisonment rates will rise with them.

The punishment-affects-crime-rates hypothesis, however, is not supported by deterrence research. Despite substantial investment in research on deterrence, most major reviews of the deterrence literature over the last 30 years have concluded that having penalties at all has deterrent effects but that there is little or no convincing evidence that changes in punishment severity have significant discernible effects on crime rates or patterns (e.g., Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978; von Hirsch et al. 1999; Doob and Webster 2003).

Two natural experiments in which one country radically changed its punishment policies and practices while a comparable adjacent country did not, without discernibly affecting crime rates, suggest that crime and punishment are independent phenomena. Finland, as a consequence of deliberate policy decisions, decreased its imprisonment rate per 100,000 population by nearly 70 percent over 30 years, from 180 per 100,000 to 60, while Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian imprisonment rates generally fluctuated between 60 and 70 per 100,000 over the same period. If punishment affects crime, Finland’s crime rate should have shot up, compared with those in the other Scandinavian countries. To the contrary, for 40 years, as figure 1 shows, Finland’s crime trends closely paralleled the rest of Scandinavia’s and Finland held its initial relative position of having the second-lowest crime rates in Scandinavia (Lappi-Seppälä 2001, 2004).

The United States and Canada provide a second example of the befuddling seeming lack of relationship between punishment and crime. As a result of deliberate policy choices, the American imprisonment rate grew continuously after 1973, more than quadrupling to 725 per 100,000 in 2003 (Tonry 2004). The absolute number of people imprisoned increased even more. Canada’s imprisonment rate during the same period fluctuated around a narrow band of 100-to-110 prisoners per 100,000. One might expect as a result that American crime rates, compared with Canada’s, would decline. However, when homicide, violent, or total crime rates since 1970 are shown
on a graph for both countries, the absolute U.S. rates are higher but the curves are the same. Figure 2 shows homicide rates. Canadian crime rate trends have closely paralleled America’s. When American rates rose, so did Canada’s. When American rates fell, so did Canada’s (Tonry 2004, figure 5.23; Doob 2004).

Other comparisons of adjacent countries make the same point. Between 1950 and 1995, English crime rates increased much more than those in Scotland. From 1980 through 1995, crime rates in Scotland leveled off without any marked increase in punishment. English crime rates rose substantially between 1980 and 1993, reaching a peak from which they continue to fall. English imprisonment rates fell steeply in the late 1980s and nearly doubled between 1993 and 2005. David Smith concludes, “At a minimum, these findings suggest that it is possible to have less crime without more punishment” (Smith 1999).

If rising crimes inexorably caused American imprisonment rates to rise and prisons to bulge, why didn’t the same thing happen in Canada? Likewise, given that crime rates rose rapidly in all Western countries from the late 1960s through the late 1980s or early 1990s, how can it be that Finland’s imprisonment rate fell steeply, those in Scandinavia, Germany, and Canada were stable, and only in the U.S. and the Netherlands did imprisonment rates rise steeply and continuously (Kuhn 2003)? Imprisonment rates in some other European countries have risen since the mid-1990s, but during a period when victimization rates were falling in most of them (van Kesteren et al. 2000).

2. Documenting the Decline

Every major source of data on crime and victimization demonstrate declining crime rates continuously or intermittently since the early-to-mid 1990s. Five sources of data are available. The first, data on recorded crime rates in various countries compiled by the United Nations, are pretty much useless as no effort is made to adjust the raw data for national differences in offense definitions, recording practices, and comprehensiveness in geographical coverage, or for changes in these things.

Second, the World Health Organization compiles data on homicide from health information systems of contributing countries. These data are useful, and do demonstrate recent declines in homicide rates in most western countries, but with the conspicuous exception of the United States, most western countries have homicide rates of 1-to-2 per 100,000 population and comparisons between countries show comparatively few differences.

Third, the International Crime Victims Survey (“ICVS”) has since the late 1980s coordinated administration of victimization surveys of representative samples of the populations of participating countries. Results are available from four data collection waves. Table 1 shows rates per 100 inhabitants for car theft, burglary, and robbery from most of the western countries that participated in at least three waves. The general pattern, best shown in the bottom row for “All [23] Countries,” is that rates increased from the first wave to the second, and declined in the third and fourth waves. That is also the pattern for most offenses for most of the countries.

The ICVS can provide at best an impression. Typical sample sizes are around 2000 and typical response rates vary between 55 and 65 percent. The impression, however, is very distinct, and the broad pattern shows—crime rates rising through the early to mid-1990s and declining thereafter—follows the pattern shown in data from national victimization surveys.

Fourth, data on registered offenses for 1995-2000 from the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics show a broad pattern of declining crime rates in Europe. Sourcebook data are a substantial improvement on United Nations data because considerable effort has been made to adjust for national differences in offence definitions and recording practices (European Sourcebook Group 2004). Table 2 shows the same three offenses as the ICVS data in table 1 (motor vehicle theft, burglary, and robbery), plus completed intentional homicide. Although the ICVS and Sourcebook offense definitions are not identical, the patterns shown for the latter part of the 1990s are the same—steady and steep decline. Burglary rates fell in all 7 countries shown, and motor vehicle and homicide rates in most. Only robbery shows an inconsistent pattern.

Fifth, the Cross-national Studies in Crime and Justice project, based at Cambridge University, has developed a sophisticated standardized data base on victimization, recorded crime, and punishment trends for eight countries (Farrington, Langan, and Continued on following page
Why are Europe’s Crime Rates Falling?  

Continued from previous page

### TABLE 1

Victimisation Rates per 100 Persons, Selected Offences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Auto Theft</th>
<th>Burglary</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: van Kesteren et al. 2000. Table 2.

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Tonry 2004; Tonry and Farrington 2006). These data show the now familiar pattern of declining crime and victimization rates during the 1990s.

Every major data source agrees: crime rates have fallen substantially in recent years in nearly every western country.

### 3. Why Are Crime Rates Falling?

Several principal explanations can be offered but others would no doubt be offered if more criminologists paid attention to the subject. The first, already rejected in the first section, is that changes in crime control policies caused the crime rate decreases. The evidence for this in the United States is weak and partial and there is no evidence at all for it outside the United States.

The second is associated with German sociologist Norbert Elias’s theory of the “civilizing process.” Swiss sociologist Manuel Eisner (2003) has developed this analysis in his important historical work on long term trends in violence. Elias posited a long-term trend toward declining acceptance of violence, brutality, and public suffering; according to this view, the recent decline in crime rates may be no more than the extension of a many-centuries-long decline in violence, and the period of rising rates from 1965-1990 merely a short-term anomaly.

A third, that would also characterize the 1965-90 increases as a short-term anomaly, might be associated with French theorist Michel Foucault’s notion of disciplinary institutions. Since at least the beginnings of the industrial revolution and the modern nation-state, individuals increasingly are socialized into roles in large impersonal institutions which functionally require people to play roles according to expectations. As time has passed those socializing institutions have done their jobs more effectively and people have become more conformist.

A fourth explanation would look at shorter-term normative changes. One relates to changes in people’s acceptance of responsibility for their own behavior and well-being. Beginning in the 1970s in the United States, for example, the prevalence of consumption of a wide range of unhealthy substances began to decline (Tonry 1995). The declines began with per capita declines in use of entirely legal—albeit unhealthy—substances: lard, butterfat, caffeine, nicotine, and alcohol. By the late 1970s, prevalence of use of illegal substances such as marijuana, heroin, and amphetamines peaked and began to fall. By the mid-1980s, use of the most deviant drug of that era, cocaine, peaked and fell. The increased self-discipline associated with personal health extended itself to behavior toward others and crime rates accordingly fell.

A somewhat different explanation would attribute behavioral changes to a deepening and broadening of the power of personal religiosity associated with the expansion of evangelical and fundamentalist religious beliefs (Wilson 2002). As moral credos become more powerful in
TABLE 2
 Registered Offences per 100,000, percentage change 1995-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Motor Vehicle Theft</th>
<th>Burglary (Total)</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Intentional Homicide (completed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-52%</td>
<td>-32%</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-26%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Sourcebook on Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics, 2nd ed; tables 1.2.1.4.,8, 10, 11

people’s religious lives it would be surprising if their secular lives were not also affected.

Those are all armchair theories which can no doubt be improved upon if scholars begin to focus their attention on a criminological phenomenon that is simultaneously among the most important and interesting but among the least studied of our time.

References:


New in 2004!

European Journal of Criminology

The Journal of the European Society of Criminology

Edited by David Smith, University of Edinburgh, UK

European Journal of Criminology is an exciting new journal that will be the prime European source for authoritative information and analysis on crime and criminal justice issues. Launched in January 2004 by the European Society of Criminology in partnership with SAGE Publications, the journal seeks to open channels of communication between academics, researchers and policy makers across the wider Europe.

At a time when crime and punishment is being hotly debated across Europe, the journal seeks to bring together broad theoretical accounts of crime, analyses of quantative data, comparative studies, systematic evaluations of interventions and discussions of criminal justice institutions. Each issue will include a 'country survey' of a selected country within the wider Europe (the EU and beyond). Country surveys will summarize essential facts about the criminal justice system, review trends in crime and punishment, and discuss major publications in recent years. The journal will also cover analysis of policy and the results of policy, but not description of policy developments.

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Prosecutorial Power Today

The nature of this key function, however, has changed in the last 20 years as prosecution service workloads increased. After all, a concept such as “sufficient evidence” can be interpreted in different ways. What of the cases, for example, in which no offender has been found? These are cases of evidential insufficiency but partly ones in which, were sufficient resources dedicated to them, this deficiency could be overcome. The prosecutor frequently has the power to order the police to investigate further, but in doing or not doing so, is effectively making a value judgement as to whether this should be done. Even in its central function, the modern prosecution service makes decisions whether it is worth taking cases to court. Its role is also to facilitate efficient use of court time. An element of discretion is reasonably present in this core function.

The prosecution service role has changed, evolving far beyond its original boundaries. Most criminal justice systems allow the prosecution service to drop cases on grounds other than mere evidential insufficiency, on what can be described as public interest grounds. In systems which do not explicitly allow this, practices achieving the same effect can be found (legislation allowing such decisions was introduced in order to codify practice in Germany, France, and the Netherlands). The prosecution function is dynamic, developing to deal with changing situations.

Under these provisions, a prosecutor has certain powers to decide whether a case warrants court time. This is not surprising in times when all European countries are experiencing scarcity of resources but rising caseloads. There are two obvious options; accept that cases will take longer before reaching court (an undesirable result politically and one that undermines deterrent effects on an offender) or find alternative ways to deal with cases.

Prosecutors in all systems decide not to proceed with cases. Most systems have given prosecution services explicit discretion to end cases under certain conditions. Criteria such as minor guilt (Germany), the expected punishment being only a fine (Sweden), and the likelihood an offender will not re-offend if not punished have all been defined as valid reasons whether a person should be tried.

Prosecutors in some systems have been given authority to impose conditions when dropping a case (France, Germany, the Netherlands). Court proceedings are not initiated (and a guilty verdict is avoided) if the suspect makes a payment to the state or a charity, undergoes treatment, agrees to mediation or performs community service. Sweden – where a prosecutorial decision, against which the accused does not appeal, is regarded as a conviction – allows prosecutorial sanctions. The prosecutor can end cases in this way only when the suspect is assumed to be guilty and, at least theoretically, if there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Agreement and fulfilment of the prescribed condition are required to avoid a trial. Court approval is required in some jurisdictions and is routinely granted.

Indirect Prosecutorial Power

Increased powers are being given to prosecutors by introduction of alternative procedural forms. These fast-track proceedings such as the composition penale in France and the Strafbefehl in Germany, which are not public and are conducted on paper only, routinely end in the court enforcing the prosecutor’s request. They are dependent upon the information given by the prosecutor and should be seen, effectively, as a prosecutorial decision that leads to a conviction and a “real” punishment (the accused can appeal this decision, often within a very limited time period).

This reality is in some places being explicitly acknowledged in the law, for example, in the newly introduced guilty plea proceedings in France or the provisions for consensual convictions in Poland, where provision is made for a judge to approve punishment agreements negotiated between prosecutor and suspect. Behind many a judicial decision today, directly or indirectly, stands a strong prosecutor.

The Implications of Change

The most obvious change caused by these developments is the proportion of cases in which suspects are “dealt with” without ever facing public trial. Decisions about (at least presumed) guilt are effectively being made by a prosecutor behind closed doors. Where a court is involved, its decisions are cursory, usually based on information provided by the prosecutor.

The non-public nature of the decision is particularly important where a presumption of guilt is established but an accused has no means to counter it. This is true, for example, of a decision to drop a case without a condition in Germany. There is no tangible effect and no ways to appeal against it were regarded as necessary. However, an entry is made in a prosecution register (for two years), accessible to all criminal justice agencies, so a slur of sorts remains, one about which an innocent individual, whose desire to clear his or her name is understandable, can do nothing.

The imposition of this kind of slur on a person’s name was previously a power reserved exclusively for courts after a full hearing. The imposition of a punishment of any kind attached to such a slur, all the more so.

Prosecutors have also gained discretion in deciding when to use their powers to drop a case or to use alternative procedural paths. This has implications for the principle of equality before the law. Firstly, practice may vary greatly. A prosecutor makes a decision largely behind closed doors. Even publicly made court decisions are subject to

Continued on next page
prosecutorial appeal in order to ensure equality.

Prosecution services try to counter the risk of unequal treatment by using internal guidelines. External scrutiny and control, however, are far less likely. The only potential lies with the accused and the victim, and their capacity to intervene has been strongly limited, as demands for increased efficiency require.

Another implication concerns the scope for negotiation. The reality is far removed from a lawyer sitting quietly at a desk pondering the application of legal norms. Prosecutors consider the suspect’s likely reaction. A weaker defendant may simply accept whatever a prosecutor suggests, but a stronger one has more leeway to negotiate. A strong defence may persuade a prosecutor that a full trial is not in the public interest for resource reasons. If every procedural possibility to slow down and complicate a trial may be exploited, a prosecutor will think harder about its value.

There is nothing new in those with more resources having advantages in the criminal justice system, but is legislative authorisation that enables this truly compatible with human rights requirements? On the other hand, is a hollow commitment to human rights requirements with knowledge that these factors operate in unregulated practice any better? This kind of prosecutorial practice has naturally developed only because there is a problem.

This is not the only difficult argument to be faced when insisting upon traditional human rights principles in this field. Another is that these kinds of solutions are good for the accused. After all, a guilty verdict and real punishment are avoided. More suspects are dealt with, more efficiently. All are factors with positive human rights implications.

One fundamental fear, however, remains: that an innocent person may accept this kind of “quasi-punishment” rather than risk trial. How attractive is the prosecutorial offer “to make it all go away”? And is this legitimate? The introduction of considerations of efficiency into prosecutorial thinking is a fundamental change; the system implicitly accepts that innocent people may be convicted or at least “quasi-punished” to ensure that as many of the guilty as possible are dealt with.

This is a central shift of priorities at the most basic level. The fact that an innocent person isn’t “really” being punished is little comfort. The suspect will feel punished: the likelihood is low that an individual feels a real difference between being fined by a court or obliged to make a conditional payment. That these solutions are applied only to less serious crimes and usually lead to fairly light quasi-punishment, doesn’t make this kind of prosecutorial decision any lesser a breach of principle.

Is the trade-off “more presumed offenders dealt-with” in exchange for the state negotiating “punishment” behind closed doors, really a desirable solution?

Consider the following context: a company accused of a serious environmental offence, but concerned to avoid negative publicity, will do much to avoid the stigma of a court trial and will see a real difference between a conviction and an informal sanction – even where this involves very heavy fines (several hundred thousand Euros) allowed in certain jurisdictions. Being sentenced by a court in a more consensual, summary form of proceeding might similarly be regarded as advantageous. Is this really what the criminal justice system should be striving for?

**Evaluation**

In many European countries, the prosecution service role is usually not much of a legal filter between the police and court. In many jurisdictions a prosecutor is also a “judge before the judge”, deciding not only which cases will be subject to stronger scrutiny, but also who will face further criminal justice system treatment at all, who will be given a warning, who a punishment of sorts after summary proceedings before a court, and who the experience of facing a full court trial.

The average European prosecution service has moved far beyond responsibility for the seemingly simple equations of evidential sufficiency to become a key player in deciding how resources are used within the criminal justice system.

A detailed evaluation of practice across Europe shows this statement to be true. It can be seen in western European countries, where even established systems are granting further discretionary power, but also in England and Wales. After a shaky start, the Crown Prosecution Service is rapidly developing characteristics of a continental-style body albeit by a different route.

The situation is not, however, entirely uniform. Poland, for example, is on a contrary path. The reforms of 2001 and 2003 apparently reinforce court power. The legacy of a communist legal order is to be swept away.

First, the catalogue of “petty offences,” although still defined as offences outside the criminal code have, at least procedurally, been re-criminalised. The criminal courts rather than the “Kollegia” (social courts) now have jurisdiction.

Second, a fundamental mistrust of prosecutorial power is manifest. This reaffirmation of core historical functions has the advantage of dogmatic clarity. Whether it will survive the pressures of practice remains to be seen.

In this respect, the Polish system bears great resemblance to the German one before the “große Strafrecsreform,” widely praised as one of mandatory prosecution. It is now the system which inspired the description of the prosecutor as “the judge before the judge,” illustrated by famous cases such as that of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl who paid DM 300 000 to facilitate a drop of charges.

This counter-trend bears contradictory elements; with the prosecution service gaining new powers to negotiate within consensual punishment proceedings.
Only time will tell, which development, towards more or less prosecutorial power, will prevail.

Other former communist countries have avoided increased pressure on the courts by retaining the effective decriminalisation of petty offences (which include minor thefts) via social courts’ jurisdiction for them. The potential for decriminalisation should be born in mind by other systems as they strive to increase criminal justice system efficiency. Procedural reform is not the only option.

One thing is certain. The prosecution service role in Europe has moved a long way from its traditional roots and it is moving still.

Notes
This article is based on the preliminary results of Marianne Wade and Jörg-Martin Jehle’s “Function of the Prosecution Service within the Criminal Justice System” project and the findings of the “European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics” (The Hague, 2003).

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Police and Prosecutor Interactions

Continued from page 3

decide whether prosecution of provable cases is in the public interest and may dispose of cases accordingly.

Patterns of Police-Prosecution Interaction

There are three main patterns:

1. Independent Police Investigation. First, in some systems police are largely independent of the prosecution service during the investigation phase and enjoy considerable decision-making authority. The English and Welsh system is an example. Until 1985, when the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was introduced, the police made all charging decisions. Now the CPS has taken over much of this function, but it remains a relatively weak prosecution service. It is strongly bound by the legality principle and has limited authority to drop or dispose of cases. The police have powerful influence on whether to prosecute cases as they pass them on to the prosecution service and the CPS can learn of cases in no other systematic way.

   English police conduct investigations independently. The CPS sometimes encourages police to initiate investigations, but has no authority to instruct them. It can influence outcomes of investigations only by dropping proceedings. The police are then bound by the CPS’ decision.

   A further, indirect means of CPS control is available once the police have handed the file on. The CPS can then change the charge if it considers this necessary or make a decision not to take the case to court.

   The police have two alternatives to passing a case on to the CPS: they can drop cases involving minor offences with no further consequences or they can end a case themselves via a formal police warning known as a caution. This is a well-established method for dealing with minor offences: about a third of all suspects are dealt with in this way.

   Thus, the police have significant decision-making powers.

B. Prosecutorial Supervisors. In the second model, the other extreme, the police play a subordinate role and the investigative stage is overseen by the prosecution service.

   Germany exemplifies such a system. The prosecution service is legally and factually responsible for the pre-trial stage and is sometimes referred to as the ‘ruler’ of the investigative stage. When there is reasonable suspicion of an offence, it is obliged to investigate, and is responsible for correct gathering of evidence. The prosecution service decides whether a case is taken to court or dropped. In making the decision, it is generally bound by the legality principle of mandatory prosecution. Since the 1970s, however, some code provisions allow the prosecution service to refrain from prosecution on discretionary grounds. Cases increasingly are disposed of by ‘conditional dismissal,’ under GCPC section 153a, when the suspect accepts a (usually) financial penalty in lieu of prosecution.

   The police perform a supporting role. They are obliged to inform the prosecution service of their actions and to provide case files to facilitate its decisions. The police are the prosecution service’s operative arm. Some police officers are appointed as prosecution service assistant officers who are obliged to follow prosecution service orders. Formally the police are a dependent institution in investigating crimes. Naturally the police retain the right of first intervention which includes all measures that cannot be delayed. They have no decision-making powers.

C. Mixed Systems. In ‘mixed systems,’ the prosecution service is in charge of criminal proceedings per se but in practice the police retain significant investigatory and decision-making power.

   The Dutch provide an example. The Dutch prosecution service has sole authority for charging and, as in Germany, is therefore legally responsible for the criminal investigation. However, investigations are usually instituted and conducted by the police; the prosecution service conducts the investigation only in significant cases.

   The prosecution service has wide-ranging discretionary powers in accordance with the opportunity principle (the legality principle governs most continental systems). Alongside the power to drop a case, the prosecution service can also dispose of cases by means of a ‘transaction’: the offender voluntarily fulfils a condition set by the

Continued on next page
Police and Prosecutor Interactions

prosecution service and avoids a public trial. In practice the most often used transaction has a financial condition under which the offender pays a sum of money to the Treasury.

This power has now also been given to the police. In relation to certain offences such as shoplifting and some traffic offences, the police may offer a transaction. In other words, the police may end criminal proceedings and divert cases from the criminal justice system. The police may offer a transaction only up to a value of 350 Euros.

Police thus have important decision-making and case-ending authority.

The discretionary powers of both police and prosecutors are, however, constrained by internal guidelines issued by the Board of Prosecutors-General. These exist for every type of offence and are intended to assure consistent use of transactions.

What appears to be a system with wide discretionary powers is instead highly structured and leaves little room for individual discretion. The opportunity principle is dominant but there is room for individual discretion. The highly structured and leaves little opportunity principle is dominant but there is room for individual discretion. The highly structured and leaves little opportunity principle is dominant but there is room for individual discretion.

Legal and Factual Change Towards a Mixed System

There is a clear tendency in Europe towards development of mixed systems of police-prosecution interaction. This can be seen in legislative changes and in evolving practices.

England’s common law system is adopting elements of continental system structures and building a new mixed system, as evidenced by the creation of the CPS in 1985. This occurred because the police’s double function as both investigating and prosecuting authority had led to serious miscarriages of justice.

The police in England and Wales still investigate independently and have far more freedom than most continental police in deciding when to use their case-ending discretion. There are still significant differences from continental European systems. The institutionalisation of a prosecution service is, however, a clear step towards a continental mixed system.

Practice in Germany has also recently moved away from the traditional model. For high-volume crimes, the police in practice have replaced the prosecution service as the ruler of the investigative stage. The police investigate independently and the prosecution service hears of the case only when the file is handed over.

At the individual state level, there are divergences from the idealised model. Bundesland Saxony, for example, since 1999 has introduced a procedure for authorising the police for some offences to prepare a case in anticipation of a discretionary case-ending decision by the prosecution service, which the prosecution service only formally acknowledges. Juvenile criminal law sometimes allows the police to conduct cautioning conversations with suspects and, if considered successful, to influence the prosecution service’s decision to drop the case to a large extent.

Conclusion

Although complete harmonization among Europe nations in police and prosecutorial operations seems impossible due to national differences, all systems appear to be evolving towards mixed systems with basic common characteristics; namely the prosecution service, at most, being only formally in charge of the investigative stage (in all but the most serious of cases) and the police becoming more or less independent. Rising caseloads are creating pressures to acknowledge powers to end or divert less serious cases. What mechanisms are used and what means are given to the police to achieve this varies significantly.

There is little reason to fear that achievement of better co-operation and harmonization among European criminal justice systems will be endlessly complex. The underlying trends are more similar than the initial impression of different national systems would suggest.

Note

1 Sprenger, Wolfgang/ Fischer, Thomas Verbesserte Verfolgung des Ladendiebstahls- Sächsisches Alternativmodell zum „Strafgeld“, in DRiZ 2000, s. 111ff. ■

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Message from the President

but that panel sessions and presentations may be offered in other languages. It is evidenced also by the short presentations of the state of criminology in different European countries in the newsletter and the in-depth country surveys that are a regular feature of the European Journal of Criminology.

Ideally, that diversity should be reflected in the composition of the executive board. Hence our proposal to amend the constitution in order to have elections by mail ballot instead of at the General Assembly, in order to enhance the direct influence of all our members.

We need a common language to communicate and to compare our experiences and, in practice, that language is now English. But we should not take it for granted. English is their second or third language for many criminologists who attend our annual meetings. I sometimes feel a new ‘European’ or ‘international’ English is emerging which all Europeans seem to understand. It may require some flexibility from native English speakers, and more emphasis on clarity of expression than on eloquence. Language should be communication, whether it is our first or our third language. Let us remember this when we meet in Krakow. ■
CESDIP and Criminal Sociology in France

SEPC and the Sociology of Social Reaction (1968-1983)

In its infancy at the time of Émile Durkheim and Gabriel Tarde, the sociology of crime developed significantly after World War II on the initiative of Henri Lévy-Bruhl, one of the last Durkheimians, and his disciple André Davidovitch. The latter, during the 1950s and 1960s, laid the first bases for a sociology of criminal justice, but the subject remained marginal in the social sciences.

From the mid-1960s, however, French research in criminology developed significantly thanks to encouragement from the Ministry of Justice and financial support from the Direction Générale à la Recherche Scientifique et Technique. The Ministry of Justice first established a research centre devoted to juvenile delinquency in 1958 in Vaucresson. It was headed, from 1964 on, by the psycho-sociologist Jacques Sélosse.

In 1968 the Service d’Études Pénales et Criminologiques (SEPC) was established by the Ministry of Justice on the initiative of Philippe Robert. Besides research, the SEPC was entrusted with the Compte général de l’administration de la justice (the judicial statistics data base).

SEPC gradually gained partial autonomy from the Ministry of Justice. It rapidly moved under the CNRS’ co-supervision, thereby attaining a primary position within the French ‘criminological’ field. SEPC established strong European and North American (in French-speaking Canada) connections, which resulted in launching the journal Déviance et Société in 1977. Critique of the criminal justice system, the reception of interactionism (Chicago’s labelling theories), and ‘critical criminology’ were pervasive.

Some topics researched by the SEPC were bound directly to the needs of the criminal justice system (predicting crime trends, criminal statistics, foreigners’ recorded crime, and drugs). Other work analysed institutional functioning (costs of crime, handling of white-collar crime, construction of gang rape as a criminal category) and the image of criminal justice in French society.

In 1973, Philippe Robert published an article presenting SEPC’s research programme in l’Année Sociologique. It heralded the crisis of what he called ‘acting out criminology’ (criminologie du passage à l’acte), a criminology centering on etiological theories of crime. He criticized bio-psychological types of research based on non-representative samples of prisoners, the prison population being the result of a highly selective process. Robert introduced labelling theory, showing that the process of transition from occasional to regular crime ‘ensues from the stigmatisation occurring as the audience classifies as deviant an individual who has just at first perpetrated a deviant act’.

Criminology can, he argued, become a ‘science of the social mechanisms of rejection,’ to which analysis of the criminal justice system is the key.

In 1983, CESDIP succeeded SEPC. It was headed by Philippe Robert for another 10 years, by Claude Faugeron in 1992-1993, and by René Lévy from 1993 to 2003. From the beginning of the 1990s, its institutional and intellectual context evolved rapidly.

While CESDIP was the only significant French research centre in this area during the 1980s, the sociology of crime and criminal justice steadily developed in other centres and universities. The government provided new encouragement and subsidies to research in some specific fields: the police (establishment of the Institut des Hautes Études de la Sécurité Intérieure in 1991), drugs (establishment of the Observatoire Français des Drogues et des Toxicomanies in 1993), juvenile delinquency and prevention (with the Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville), and traffic safety (with the Délégation Interministérielle à la Sécurité Routière). In some respects, historical and sociological prison research also grew from the 1980s on.

New research areas developed and others stagnated. The principal innovation of the 1990s was the development of victimisation and fear-of-crime surveys. The first were inaugurated by CESDIP in the mid-80s but they expanded only during the 1990s, due to strong concern about crime and public safety. The early focus was mainly on victims’ behaviour, especially reporting behaviour, but increasingly they came to be used as an alternative instrument to measure crime.

Surveys on fear of crime were first developed at the end of the 1980s, notably thanks to two political scientists from Grenoble, Hugues Lagrange and Sébastien Roché, and later to a sociologist from Lille, Dominique Duprez. Such surveys were taken up by the CESDIP from the second half of the 1990s.

The other apparent innovation of this period was not, in fact, a real one: it was the assumption of research on juvenile delinquency (after the decline of the specialised centre in Vaucresson in the late 1980s). The weight of the context should be underlined here; it pushed juvenile delinquency and trouble in ‘suburbs’ to the top of media and political agendas. The result was strong...
CESDIP Continued from previous page

institutional research expectations, particularly concerning ‘urban violence’. In comparison with previous decades, more research was based on quantitative data, due to the increasing role of statistics and ‘expertise’ in the public debate.

Finally, in the second-half of the 1990s, ‘school violence’ emerged, connected with juvenile delinquency and strongly encouraged by public funding. CESDIP invested little energy in these issues during the early 1990s, but did so by the decade’s end.

Some fields have never much developed. One is the study of upper classes’ crime (traditionally deemed ‘white collar crime’), in the private or public sectors. Corruption, money laundering, business crime, tax evasion, violations of labour laws, extension of administrative criminal law, new strategies of insurance companies... The field is potentially very wide but few researchers have consistently done the spadework on it (with the exception of Pierre Lascoumes, a former researcher at CESDIP, and Thierry Godefroy, still a researcher there). Sentencing remains another under-researched domain, despite the pioneering work of André Davidovitch and, later, of Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay.

CESDIP’s Current Research Staff and Research Programme

CESDIP has been headed by Laurent Mucchielli since 1st January 2004. A major development institutionally is a new partnership with the University of Versailles St-Quentin en Yvelines. Researchers from CESDIP are currently teaching in three master’s programmes of this university in sociology and in political science. Two university professors have also recently joined the centre (Jean-Marc Berlière and Sophie Body-Gendrot,) leading to the participation in its work of a growing number of doctoral students. CESDIP also welcomes several post-graduate students, working on contracts while awaiting a position at the CNRS or in a university.

The centre is enjoying significant growth and today numbers fifty people (10 CNRS researchers, 9 tenured academics, 7 post-graduate students, most teaching in various universities, 16 doctoral students, and 7 administrative staff who deal with the secretarial work, management, documentation, and publications, assisted by two temporary staff), not to mention students and research assistants temporarily employed on specific pieces of research.

CESDIP has in recent years consistently reinforced its European dimension. Not only is the Groupe Européen de Recherches sur les Normativités (European Group of Research into Norms – GERN – headed by Philippe Robert and René Lévy) located in its premises, but it is also the headquarters of a French-German Laboratoire Européen Associé – LEA. Members are the Max-Planck-Institute, Freiburg and the CLERSE, Lille (another CNRS centre). Finally, CESDIP is a Marie-Curie Research Training Network centre, welcoming foreign doctoral students benefiting from a EU Marie Curie Fellowship (8 since 2003).

CESDIP’s research programme is currently organised around seven themes:

1. Victimisation and fear of crime. CESDIP is the only centre carrying out local victimisation surveys, mainly on medium-sized and large cities, currently as a contractor for the Forum Français pour la Sécurité Urbaine. This programme is run by Philippe Robert, Renée Zauberman, and Emmanuel Didier, with assistance from research assistants.

2. Juvenile delinquency. Research on delinquency has recently revived thanks to Laurent Mucchielli (violence, prevention policies, social representations of juvenile delinquency), Maryse Esterle-Hédibel and Cécile Carra (juvenile delinquency, school violence), Marwan Mohamed (group phenomena and juvenile gangs), Eric Marlière (juvenile deviance, occupation of public space), Rachid Boumririche (trends in recorded delinquency and its judicial handling between 1990 and 2000), Nasser Démiati (community crime prevention), and Véronique Levan (situational crime prevention).

3. History. This has been an important presence at CESDIP. In 1997, René Lévy launched the journal Crime, History and Societies, which is published in French and English. He is the leader, along with Jean-Marc Berlière and his doctoral students, of a research programme and seminar on the history of the French national police since the 19th century. CESDIP takes an interest in the history of criminology and deviance studies and supports publication of the Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines, co-edited by Laurent Mucchielli.

4. Police. Fabien Jobard is researching police violence in France and police in democratic transition in Germany. L. Mucchielli, R. Zauberman, and Sylvie Clément are studying criminal investigation work. Delphine Minotti Vu-Ngoc concentrates on police violence in Colombia, and Azilis Maguer on police co-operation in Europe. Finally, E. Didier is carrying out research on the introduction into France of the ‘New-York City model’ of police statistics.

5. Professionals in the penal field. Paul Mignon is researching the French gendarmerie and Patricia Bénéc’h-Le Roux lawyers and magistrates. Raymonde Bossis wrote her PhD dissertation on court clerks. Marie-Danièle Barré has been studying front store workers in the field of drug addiction and Thierry...
Godefroy customs officers.

6. Statistics. CESDIP has been expert in criminal statistics since its creation. B. Aubusson is pursuing the construction of the Davido data base which collects all French judicial statistics since the 19th century. He is the French contributor to the European Sourcebook of the Council of Europe and has recently undertaken new research on administrative courts statistics, along with M.-D. Barré. Research on trends in recorded crime in those zones of the French territory submitted to gendarmerie policing is also being carried out by L. Mucchielli and D. Saurier.

7. Corrections. CESDIP has a long history of research on prison demography, under the direction of Pierre Tournier (who left CESDIP in 2003). B. Aubusson is working on pre-trial detention statistics, and R. Lévy on electronic monitoring home detention. Other research uses qualitative methodology: Jean-Marie Renouard has written a monograph on a correctional facility in its economic and social environment and is working now on adjusted sentences. Gilles Chantraine is carrying out comparative research between France and Quebec on social relationships in prison. Evelyne Shea-Fischer is focusing her doctoral dissertation on salaried work in prison, comparing France, England, and Germany. Finally, a small research team has just been set up to examine the impact of incarceration on juveniles’ life courses.

All of this information, most CESDIP publications, and a programme of seminars and colloquia are posted on our website: www.cesdip.com

Note


This paper has been translated by Françoise Le Corre, revised by Renée Zauberman.

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